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The landscape of cross-border evidence gathering in criminal 
matters in the EU has become blurred. Non-traditional actors, 
such as administrative authorities and intelligence services, have 
joined traditional judicial and law enforcement authorities in a 
domain which used to be looked upon as predominantly judicial 
cooperation territory.  Criminal justice and administrative finalities 
run the risk of being constantly mixed up. This creates problems in 
light of the separation of powers, adequate legal and procedural 
protection in criminal matters and data protection. Gert Vermeulen 
believes that restoring the balance requires stepping away from 
traditional authority-based thinking and policy-making. He suggests 
to embrace ‘criminal justice finality’ as the key normative marker for 
EU cross-border intelligence, information and evidence gathering 
and exchange  in criminal matters. The traditional distinction 
between judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters can no 
longer be upheld, he concludes. He argues that the distinction is 
largely artificial, creates confusion and produces inconsistencies, 
thus hindering the establishment and further development of a 
coherent EU criminal law policy. 
Vermeulen also challenges the envisaged roll-out of the mutual 
recognition principle in the context of cross-border evidence 
gathering. He is in particular concerned that it would prompt an 
inacceptable burden upon criminal justice systems either financially 
or in terms of operational capacity. 
In order to systemically prevent admissibility problems of cross-
border evidence in courts throughout the EU, he finally pleas for a 
free movement regime for evidence, based on common minimum 
procedural standards according to which it must have been 
gathered.
Prof. dr. Gert  Vermeulen is professor of international and European 
criminal law at Ghent University, director of the Institute for 
International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) and extraordinary 
professor of evidence law at Maastricht University.
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Distinguished rector, dean,
Dear colleagues,
Dear family and friends,
Ladies and gentlemen,
“There are times when a commentator wishes the EU would sit still 
long enough to allow itself to be analysed”.1 Back in 1999, I used this 
phrase from an article by Bill Tupman as a side quote in the book 
version of my Ph.D., in which I had conducted a critical analysis of five 
years of EU negotiations on mutual legal assistance (hereafter: MLA) 
in criminal matters.2 The object of my research – the EU, in making 
criminal policy – had behaved like a subject, choosing its own path, 
organically and often without too much logic, quite unpredictable in 
its constant movement. A member of my examination committee, 
during the defence of my thesis, had warned me that, if I were to 
continue studying EU criminal law (cooperation), my career would be 
much like a non-stop challenge to catch a moving train. She proved 
right. The EU doesn’t sit still.
Some love is forever, though, and for me, this is among others true 
for EU cooperation in criminal matters. So I continued to critically 
study every single move concerned the EU has made, ever since, be 
it no longer as a distant, supposedly neutral researcher. Producing 
knowledge and insights about the past, largely having merely theoreti-
cal and potential relevance for criminal policy making at EU level 
only, wouldn’t have felt satisfactory any longer. I chose therefore to 
approach my research subject differently, in that I started to study 
it from more closely, even from within, and to interact with it, walk 
with it, talk with it, while it continued to move, and to suggest it to 
reflect on its future steps, or even to choose a different path when 
arriving at a cross-roads. The EU, of course, has continued to live 
its own life, with everything to it. Still, I got the feeling that it has 
gradually shown more openness for the participatory companionship 
of and guidance and assistance by professional researchers, who aim 
at improving its criminal policy making and criminal law cooperation 
strategies by action research, primarily present and future oriented. 
I now try to study my research subject while trying to influence it, 
allowing me to study the impact thereof as well, undoubtedly while 
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being influenced in my turn by the EU and by the EU and member 
states’ judicial and police realities.
That is why today, I choose to quote from the early work of Bill Torbert, 
one of the icons of (organisational) action research: “Research and 
action, even though analytically distinguishable, are inextricably 
intertwined in practice. Knowledge is always gained in action and 
for action. [...] From this starting point, to question the validity of 
social science is to question, not how to develop a reflective science 
about action, but how to develop genuinely well-informed action” 
[emphasis added].3 It summarizes well the way I have been trying 
to conduct research on the EU’s criminal policy in the past decade 
back home, at Ghent University. Most probably, it also characterizes 
much of the scientific work we conduct there at IRCP, the Institute for 
International Research on Criminal Policy. It is not the better choice. 
It’s a choice – the one that for me makes more sense and is more 
satisfactory. It’s tiring, sure, but much fun, and fits my personality.
This type of criminal policy research necessarily builds on empirical 
data, tries to take stock of realities, both political and on the cross-
border working floor. Our primary respondents are EU stakeholders, 
the European Commission, the Council, Eurojust and Europol as the 
main relevant EU agencies, their college members respectively staff 
and liaison officers, the member states, EU negotiators, ministries and 
central authorities, criminal justice actors in the member states, i.e. 
magistrates, prosecutors, judges, police officials and defence lawyers, 
as well as NGO’s and fellow scholars and researchers.
The choice to focus today’s lecture on cross-border investigation and 
evidence gathering in criminal matters in the EU, is prompted by 
three reasons.
First, I deliver this inaugural lecture in accepting an extraordinary 
professorship of ‘Evidence Law’, so that there needs to be a clear-cut 
link. I choose to simply deal with subject matter that is forefront in the 
‘Evidence’ course I teach in the Master in Forensics, Criminology and 
Law at the Faculty of Law of this University. Allow me to say, in this 
respect, that the absolute freedom I enjoyed in conceptualizing this 
course has made it easy to accept to teach it. It simply allowed me to 
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logically extend part of my core research into academic teaching, the 
same way I enjoy this pleasure in Ghent. That is what all academics 
dream of. I am a lucky bird, no doubt. Consequently, there was no 
other option but trying to reflect this research-teaching match in 
today’s lecture.
Second, choosing this topic allows me to illustrate why I feel at home 
in this new Maastricht environment. In some way, the dots connect. 
The current rector, Gerard Mols, has a strong scientific track record 
himself in international and European criminal law, among others 
on issues like the political offence (exception) and inter-state police 
cooperation. He was also among the very first in Europe to edit a 
volume (Dissonanten bij het Akkoord van Schengen)4 in which the then 
newly concluded Schengen Implementation Convention (hereafter: 
SIC) of 1990 was critically assessed, including from a suspect’s and 
defence perspective. His article in this volume together with Taru 
Spronken, one of my current Maastricht colleagues in the department 
of criminal law and criminology, titled ‘Europa 1992, een moeras voor 
verdachte en verdediging?’,5 was among the very first scientific articles I 
read in my early academic career, almost 20 years ago. I just embarked 
then, as a young researcher on the topic of legal protection in the 
context of European cross-border cooperation in criminal matters.6 
The article of Mols and Spronken has certainly helped me in making 
and keeping the concern for an adequate legal status of suspects and 
defendants in cross-border proceedings a core axis of my research 
on the matter, together with the belief that such concern is not the 
antithesis of efficient law enforcement cooperation but needs to be 
combined therewith. In the mean time, I have been able to enjoy the 
pleasure to conduct joint research with Taru on the observance of 
procedural rights in criminal proceedings7 and effective defence in 
the EU member states. Both projects have provided ammunition for 
the EU Procedural Rights Roadmap, which is being rolled out since 
late 2009 as a means to create a better trust base for the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters, which in its turn had become 
the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters since the 
1999 Tampere European Council. Her work brings more balance 
to EU criminal law. I see my position in Maastricht as an excellent 
opportunity to further enhance our joint research efforts. Needless 
to say that I get along very well with André Klip too, another of my 
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current Maastricht colleagues. We have a joint passion for interna-
tional and European criminal law for quite a while. We first met in 
1993 in Utrecht, before he moved to Maastricht, and have ever since 
maintained professional and friendship relations. I think we have 
complementary profiles. Along the road, he started to focus more on 
international criminal tribunal law, whereas I primarily persevered in 
international cooperation in criminal matters. His EU criminal law 
research is strongly jurisprudence-based and more legal sensu stricto. 
Mine is more action-like, as sketched before, is criminal policy rather 
than strict legal research and tends to have an important empirical 
dimension. This I share with Hans Nelen, another Maastricht col-
league – actually my head of department here. He is a professor in 
criminology, with a strong focus on empirical and evaluation research, 
dealing with subjects including law enforcement, both administrative 
and criminal, the tackling of financial and economic delinquency 
and of serious, corporate, organised and organisational crime. He 
also takes a keen interest in cross-border cooperation, especially at 
police level. I hope to provoke more collaboration with him too by 
holding this lecture. He may not be aware of it, but his early work 
at the Research and Documentation Centre of the then Ministry of 
Justice in the Netherlands (WODC), on the economy of drug careers,8 
was a primary source of knowledge in the context of my very first 
research project in Ghent, in 1992, on the relation between drugs 
and crime.9 As I said, certain dots connect today.
Third, the topic of free gathering and movement of evidence in 
criminal matters in the EU allows me to not only introduce myself 
to today’s audience in my preferred research domain, i.e. cross-
border investigation in criminal matters in the EU, but to do so on 
a moment that I feel I have sufficiently matured in it. Today I dare 
to present you my vision, which I like to believe is footed in EU and 
member state realities, balanced but at the same time without too 
much compromising, and which I hope may somehow revolutionize 
policies through sufficient out of the box thinking. Over the years, 
since my Ph.D. in 1999 on EU MLA in criminal matters, I have had 
the occasion to conduct many EU criminal law cooperation research 
projects, often funded by the European Commission. Today, I use the 
occasion to also content-wise connect the dots of these projects. The 
by far most interesting research project I have been able to conduct 
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until date, is the Study on the future institutional and legal framework 
of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. The study, called 
for by the European Commission,10 and which really has been a joint 
effort of the core IRCP EU criminal law research unit in Ghent, was 
concluded just weeks ago. Conceptually, it builds on much of the EU 
criminal law research I have concluded or led at IRCP. The book, 
comprising the results, is forthcoming.11 Our original mandate has 
been to conceptually prepare the future of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters – to sort of design an EU master plan for judicial 
cooperation, doing away with inconsistencies, incoherencies and 
lacunae that have been prompted by the organic development that has 
characterized the very domain. Not only does the study encompass 
all traditional judicial cooperation domains (extradition/surrender, 
MLA, transfer of prosecution, transfer of the execution of foreign 
sentences). It also covers the trans-border pre-trial supervision of 
suspects, the exchange of criminal records information, the taking 
account of previous foreign convictions in new proceedings, the 
cross-border protection and relocation of witnesses and collaborators 
with justice. It further addresses the future of Eurojust and assesses 
the need for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. All this proved to 
be impossible without radically thinking bigger, beyond the borders 
of judicial cooperation. We broadened our field of research (convinc-
ing the European Commission of the necessity thereof), resolutely 
adding police cooperation (including the future of Europol) to it, 
moving into the intersection between criminal and administrative 
law, juggling with intelligence-led approaches, information and 
intelligence sharing practices and intelligence actors that have set 
foot on criminal law territory, actively blurring traditional boundaries 
in order to see more clearly after it, in the pursuit of a renewed logic, 
coherence and balance.
Applied to the future of cross-border gathering and use of evidence in 
criminal matters, I want to share the following findings and thoughts 
with you today,12 exploring the possibilities and preconditions for 
enhanced freedom in gathering (i.e. during the pre-trial investiga-
tion stage) respectively using (i.e. during the trial stage) evidence in 
criminal matters in the EU.
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Obviously, the interpretation of the term ‘evidence’ will differ between 
both stages. While the discussion around the usability of evidence 
‘before court’ essentially depends on the admissibility thereof (leav-
ing aside here questions of evaluation or weighting of admissible 
evidence, which will remain an issue to be discussed before and 
decided by court), the term will be used in a more generic sense when 
exploring the issue during the pre-trial investigation stage. In the 
latter context, ‘evidence’ will refer to any information, data or objects 
that the competent authorities consider relevant in the intelligence 
process relating to, prevention, detection or tracing of, proactive and 
preliminary investigation into, or prosecution of punishable offences.
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Free gathering of evidence
The possibilities and preconditions for enhanced freedom in evidence 
gathering can be explored from various perspectives, outlined below.
A. By whichever authorities, irrespective of the finality of their 
actions?
By means of introduction, it is good to recall or point out that the 
contemporary landscape of cross-border EU cooperation in criminal 
matters in view of the gathering of evidence in the generic sense of 
the word is quite blurred in terms of authorities involved. Next to 
judicial authorities, acting with criminal justice finality, at least five 
more types of authorities can be distinguished, all capable of operating 
with an either criminal justice or administrative finality:
– police authorities are involved in criminal justice matters, but also 
in tasks with an administrative (public order) finality;
– customs authorities also have criminal justice related and admin-
istrative tasks;
– sometimes, administrative authorities also have the competence to 
impose sanctions for offences, next to their competence to sanction 
other administrative infringements;
– in addition, specific central authorities have been established or 
appointed with a specific mandate to act in international coopera-
tion in criminal matters or to deal with (information exchange 
relating to) certain types of crime. It could be administrations 
within the ministries of justice, witness protection units, financial 
intelligence units, Europol national units, European Judicial 
Network (EJN) contact points, etc. Their work can easily be labelled 
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as both or either having a criminal justice and/or administrative 
finality;
– finally, even if traditionally they ought not to operate with a criminal 
justice finality, intelligence services in several instances apparently 
do, or they at least contribute to actions carried out with such 
finality. Especially after 9/11, they do appear more and more in 
cross-border criminal law cooperation settings.
1. A matter of judicial cooperation, by judicial authorities only?
In denial of reality, as shown above, evidence gathering is often 
perceived to be a matter of judicial cooperation only. Most probably, 
this is due to the fact that evidence will ultimately have to stand the 
test in court, i.e. before a judicial authority sensu stricto. Even in the 
trial phase though, the admissibility of evidence should not (critically) 
depend on whether it has been collected by a judicial authority, but 
rather on the observance of procedural rules in collecting it. In the 
pre-trial phase, most definitely, evidence issues are a matter of much 
more than judicial authorities only.
When having a proper look at most cooperation instruments that 
judicial authorities may use in information and evidence gather-
ing across borders (the 1959 Council of Europe (CoE) European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in criminal matters (hereafter: 
ECMA); the protocols thereto; the SIC; the 1997 Convention on 
mutual assistance between customs administrations (hereafter: 
Naples II); the 2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance in 
criminal matters (hereafter: EU MLA); the protocol thereto; the 
Eurojust Decision; the 2006 ‘Swedish’ Framework Decision (FD); 
the 2008 European Evidence Warrant FD (hereafter: EEW); the 2009 
Criminal Records FD), the truth is that member states are allowed 
considerable discretion in indicating which authority they deem 
to be ‘judicial’ for the application of the instruments concerned. 
Practice shows that member states, next to judicial authorities, 
often assign central, governmental but also police, customs (and 
in a single member state case: even intelligence) authorities as 
‘judicial’ or ‘competent’ authorities. Even typical ‘judicial coopera-
tion’ is apparently largely a matter of much more than cooperation 
between ‘judicial’ authorities only.
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Not only the member states, but also the CoE and the EU themselves, 
in designing judicial cooperation instruments, have abandoned the 
demarcation line based on authorities decades ago – be it fragmentary 
and far from in a consistent fashion. Administrative authorities may 
be or are charged with criminal records information exchange (ECMA; 
Criminal Records FD) or may use judicial cooperation instruments 
when it comes to administrative offences (SIC; EU MLA; EEW). There 
is built-in flexibility of authorities (judicial or equivalent, police and 
customs) for a series of special cooperation forms, such as controlled 
deliveries, joint investigation teams (JITs), infiltration and interception 
of telecommunications (EU MLA). Such flexibility was radically taken 
over for law enforcement information exchange, by bringing judicial 
authorities under that label as well, in addition to police and customs 
authorities, be it that such information will be deemed ineligible as 
‘evidence before court’ (‘Swedish’ FD). It has been recognized that 
the prosecutorial competency may be entrusted to a prosecutor, 
judge or police officer of equivalent competence (Eurojust Decision). 
Police, customs, judicial and other competent authorities have been 
subjected to the very same data protection rules (2008 Data Protection 
FD). It is sometimes recognized that it suffices for a decision by a 
non-judicial authority to be labelled as ‘judicial’ after validation by a 
judge, court, public prosecutor or investigative magistrate (2011 Draft 
Directive on a European Investigation Order (hereafter: Draft EIO)), 
much in line with the ambiguous ‘for police use only’ autonomous 
police information exchange under the SIC). Recently, no further 
distinction has been maintained between information contained 
in databases held by police or judicial authorities (Draft EIO). The 
picture has become very much blurred – to say the least.
Finally, the time has also come to do away with the recurring mis-
conception that adequate data protection with regard to the exchange 
of data that have already been gathered, requires the involvement 
of ‘judicial’ authorities, as opposed to ‘non-judicial’ authorities. It 
suffices for data protection rules to be linked to the finality of data 
handling, regardless of the authorities involved. Consequently, data 
protection needs to be a joint matter of concern for any authority acting 
with criminal justice finality. It must be as stringent for all types of 
cooperation in criminal matters, regardless of whether judicial, police, 
customs, administrative, central (or, in some case: even intelligence) 
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authorities are involved. One single data protection regime should 
bind all authorities involved in cooperation in criminal matters. The 
relevant EU legislation as it stands, confirms this. Often, even more 
attention is paid to data protection issues in instruments relating 
to law enforcement (cooperation) (e.g. data protection regulations 
in the 2005 Prüm Convention or the 2008 EU Prüm Decision, or 
with respect to the functioning of Europol) than in those regulating 
cooperation between judicial authorities (e.g. a single article on data 
protection in EU MLA). Additionally, the distinction between data 
protection rules applicable to judicial respectively police cooperation 
has been formally labelled as irrelevant in the Data Protection FD. 
Our freshly concluded Study on the future of international coopera-
tion in criminal matters points out that an overwhelming majority 
of the member states (20) support the position that adequate data 
protection does not require the involvement of judicial authorities. 
From this perspective, it is e.g. incomprehensible that the exchange 
of criminal records is considered to remain a prerogative of judicial 
cooperation, thus depriving police authorities in many member states 
and – at least indirectly – Europol (which is even supposed to hold 
data on convicted persons) of essential information.
In conclusion, both at CoE and EU level, both in ‘old’ conventions 
and in ‘newer’ legal instruments relating to ‘judicial’ cooperation, the 
demarcation line between different types of authorities based on their 
nature/name has become extremely fuzzy. Upholding therefore that 
the pre-trial gathering of evidence in the generic sense of the word 
is a matter of judicial cooperation in criminal matters only, is a joke. 
It is a joint matter of various ‘competent’ authorities working with 
a criminal justice finality. Our study on the future of international 
cooperation in criminal matters largely supports this. Half of the 
member states do agree that the discretion allowed to define the scope 
of ‘judicial’ cooperation themselves is non-functional and ultimately 
even misleading. 1/4th of the member states – roughly these that have 
chosen to appoint only ‘judicial’ authorities as competent authorities 
for the application of judicial cooperation instruments – felt no need 
for a conceptual shift from ‘judicial cooperation’ to ‘cooperation in 
criminal matters’ from their own perspective. The remaining 1/4th 
finds that, since the CoE and the EU themselves have built in express 
‘authority flexibility’ or accepted ‘judicial’ equivalence in very many 
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instruments, traditional conceptions of ‘judicial cooperation’ being a 
matter of judicial authorities and information and evidence gathering 
being a matter of ‘judicial cooperation’ artificial and unworkable.
2. Distinction judicial vs police cooperation: Artificial, often 
counterproductive or useless
Yet, in many instances the EU tends to still uphold a strict distinction 
between judicial and police (used here as a generic term for police 
and customs) authorities, not only through treating judicial and police 
cooperation as two separate policy making areas (thus preventing both 
to reach their full potential), but also through many other artificial 
distinctions. Even if quite upfront and seemingly provocative as a 
statement, I believe the traditional distinction between judicial and 
police cooperation in criminal matters should largely be abolished. It 
creates confusion. Often, the distinction concerned is either inexistent, 
non-essential, unworkable or counterproductive. It is an anomaly, 
hindering the establishment and roll-out of a coherent EU criminal 
law policy. ‘International cooperation in criminal matters should 
become the default concept, as was already pointed out before. Period. 
The EU reality is painfully different. Some highlights.
The most distressing example is undoubtedly the parallel yet separated 
existence and further development of Europol and Eurojust.
It is commendable that the Eurojust Decision refers to the Europol 
Decision for its mandate, making their mandate ratione materiae grosso 
modo the same. This makes perfect sense given that the support of 
police investigations can simply not be distinguished clearly from 
pre-trial investigate led by the public prosecution in most member 
states. However, the ongoing discussions regarding the mutual 
accessibility to each other’s data systems (exemplified by the lack 
of Eurojust access to the crucial Islamic terrorism analytical work 
file at Europol), which, besides, diverge entirely ratione materiae in 
terms of classification, are exemplary for a criminal law policy which 
ultimately is bound to fail.
Many problems which will be up for EU negotiation in the near future 
(not in the least the adoption of a regulation as legal basis for both 
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bodies) require a helicopter view, as opposed to an approach built on 
the nature of authorities involved. Unlike for their mandates, Europol 
and Eurojust differ significantly in working structure. Simultaneously, 
and with great flexibility and autonomy, the Eurojust College assumes 
the different roles which at Europol level are scattered between the 
director, the management board and the ELO Network. Moreover, 
Europol, since it has become a supranational agency, is increasingly 
subject to political control by the European Commission. On top of 
that, the Eurojust College members are allowed to form part of JIT’s, 
either on behalf of Eurojust or on behalf of their home member state. 
It should be hoped that the future Eurojust Regulation, based on 
Article 85 TFEU, will not put an end to this flexibility and versatility; 
and that the future Europol Regulation will alleviate the structure of 
this agency.
Ideally both bodies should merge into one. This seems idle 
hope in light of the (politically explainable) split of the former 
directorate-general Freedom, Security and Justice in separate 
directorates-general Justice (Commissioner Reding) and Home 
Affairs (Commissioner Malmström). Notwithstanding that the 
Lisbon Treaty regrouped all justice and home affairs matters (for 
ten years, under the Amsterdam regime, asylum, migration and 
external affairs were treated from a community perspective, whereas 
justice and police policy remained predominantly intergovernmen-
tal, even if the Commission enjoyed a right of initiative), the split 
into two directorates-general has definitively separated the policy 
work around justice and police. Both Commissioners now have 
‘their’ agency to further develop: one has Eurojust, the other has 
Europol. Given the different nature of both policies (put way too 
bluntly and oversimplified: freedoms and rights vs. security), a 
logical, consistent, functional and integrative future approach for 
Eurojust and Europol becomes rather unlikely in the short term. 
Politicians, and the agencies with the them probably, tend to get 
primarily self-centred and to develop territorial behaviour.
The distinction between judicial and police cooperation is not only 
maintained with regard to Eurojust and Europol. The distinction 
between both domains, policy-wise, is total. This prompted a series 
of inequalities. Some examples.
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With the US there is only a Europol-US agreement yet no EU-US 
agreement regarding police cooperation, while there is a Eurojust-US 
agreement and already in 2003 two EU-US agreements concerning 
judicial cooperation were concluded – among which one for MLA, 
encompassing the exchange of so-called judicial information (which 
is obviously often the same information the police are after).
On the judicial level, important efforts were made to improve the day-
to-day cooperation practice through practical tools and mechanisms 
(EJN, the fiches belges, the European judicial atlas etc.), while the police 
practice would benefit just as much from this. The EU chose not 
to do this and consequently practitioners need to help themselves.
In the ‘judicial cooperation’ scheme, the EU has categorically opted 
for horizontalisation of the cooperation, introduced first in the SIC, 
then further elaborated in the EU MLA and today close to being fully 
implemented in the context of the mutual recognition principle (2006 
Freezing Order FD, EEW, Draft EIO). The interstate (and political) 
character of cooperation has been abandoned; the obligatory and 
unique transfer and execution of requests through ministries and 
central authorities is largely in the past (not to mention exceptions 
such the UK Home Office or the regional IRC’s in The Netherlands, 
which qualify as decentralized central authorities). Locally competent 
authorities cooperate with each other as much as possible, in an ever 
more real European area of justice. Regarding police level coopera-
tion it is striking that for too long (leaving the ‘Swedish’ FD and 
the availability principle aside) the attention was almost exclusively 
focused on central models/databases linked up with national units 
(Europol National Units, NSIS, Sirene bureaus, Interpol NCB’s etc.)
A European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) has been 
designed for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, without any 
direct involvement or relevance for the police, which was already 
criticized above. Together with Unisys, IRCP will now embark on a 
new study – unsurprisingly called for by the directorate-general Home 
Affairs – ‘on possible ways to enhance efficiency in the exchange of 
police records between the Member States by setting up a European 
Police Records Index System (EPRIS)’.13 In our action-research capac-
ity, we will try to convince policy makers of the necessity to think 
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bigger, in designing EPRIS beyond something for police authorities 
only, to functionally link it with ECRIS, to conceptually confront it 
with the direct access to databases under the Prüm regime and to 
allow for conditioned access rights for Europol and Eurojust.
In conclusion, despite many counterexamples, on crucial points a 
strict policy distinction is maintained (if not stirred through the split 
in directorates-general) between the so-called judicial and police 
cooperation in criminal matters. Ultimately, that hinders the develop-
ment of an efficient justice policy, fully involving police work with 
a judicial finality.
3. Limited necessity for ‘judicial’ safeguards
On the one hand, the EU is inconsistent in keeping a clear distinction 
between administrative and criminal justice finalities. As shown in 
the previous paragraphs, the EU very often stresses the demarcation, 
entirely disregarding it on other occasions.
On the other hand, the EU omits to clearly indicate when the dis-
tinction between judicial and non-judicial does matter. Whereas 
traditionally judicial prerogatives were assumed (without necessitating 
explicit reasons or motivation), lately (in particular the last decade), 
when drafting the so-called judicial cooperation instruments, the EU 
has almost systematically given the member states carte blanche by 
allowing them to appoint the ‘competent’ authorities themselves. In 
itself, this flexibility is not a bad thing, quite the contrary: it supports 
the shifting focus from authorities involved to the finality with which 
they act. However, in a few instances, ‘judicial’ safeguards seem 
to be necessary: not necessarily in the form of appointing judicial 
authorities as competent authorities, yet through a right to a legal 
remedy for the person involved.
In domestic contexts, in light of the ECHR, the ECtHR jurisprudence 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it can hardly be doubted 
that the involvement of judicial authorities (or at least of equivalent 
authorities or authorities whose decisions have been validated by 
judicial authorities) is a necessity when taking coercive measures 
(which likely impact on the right to property) or measures which are 
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intrusive to the right to privacy or data protection in particular. In 
the context of our study on the future of international cooperation in 
criminal matters, almost all member states confirmed this position 
(regardless, that is, of which authorities would execute the measure 
on the ground).
In evidence gathering cooperation contexts, our study on the future 
of international cooperation shows that, not only for sensitive and 
intrusive techniques such as controlled deliveries and infiltration for 
which the EU MLA expressly allowed for entrusting them to police or 
customs authorities, but also for the interception of telecommunica-
tions, for which the EU MLA required a domestic order legitimately 
issued in the requesting member state by a judicial or ‘equivalent’ 
authority, averagely half of the member states have appointed non-
judicial authorities as the ‘competent’ authorities.
It seems therefore that half of the member states consider the type 
of authority non-determining from the perspective of compliance 
with ‘judicial’ safeguards as required by the ECHR, the ECtHR or 
the Charter. Apparently, only the procedures by which authorities act, 
matter. I suggest the EU to take stock of this reality and to radically 
shift the focus to the procedures by which judicial, so-called equivalent, 
police or customs authorities should act and to the judicial remedies 
that need to be in place in taking certain investigating measures.
The approach followed in the EEW and in the Draft EIO is commend-
able from this perspective. Both instruments introduced an obligation 
for member states to foresee in judicial remedies for those measures 
involving coercive measures, equivalent to those, which would be 
available in a similar domestic case to challenge the investigative 
measure in question.
As to the nature of the bodies carrying out the judicial review, the 
name tag they carry seems again of secondary importance only. In 
the context of the EEW for example, it is perfectly conceivable that an 
administrative authority would take on this task. Yet, as stated above, 
as little as the name tag matters, as much do the procedural safeguards 
which are applied by those bodies; as long as they abide by criminal 
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procedural safeguards and grant the subject a fair ‘judicial’ review 
of the decision, the nature of the authority is of minor importance.
B. Decisive marker: Criminal justice finality
Notwithstanding the reservatory ‘judicial’ safeguards that need to be 
in place, the finality with which authorities act – as opposed to their 
nature – should become the decisive and sole demarcation criterion 
for consistently delineating the field of ‘cooperation in criminal mat-
ters’. The EU has recognised this fact for decades; unfortunately only 
indirectly and on an ad hoc basis. Lack of respect for this demarcation 
line is problematic in light of the separation of powers, the procedural 
guarantees in criminal matters and data protection regulations.
In the context of administrative offences the finality distinction has 
been made explicit at EU level since the SIC, recognizing for the first 
time that administrative authorities too can act with a criminal justice 
finality and thus can be brought within the scope of cooperation in 
criminal matters in as far as their decisions are subject to an appeal 
before a judge also competent in criminal matters. There is only 
one legitimate cross-over situation when it comes to keeping a strict 
separation between criminal justice and administrative finalities: 
criminal justice information can and should, whenever it is useful 
in preventing an immediate and serious threat to public security, be 
shared with the competent (administrative or intelligence) authorities.
1. Part of the EU acquis
I consider it essential to further maintain and where no longer or 
inexistent (re)introduce a strict separation between criminal justice 
and administrative finalities. My firm position is rooted in respect for 
the separation of powers, procedural rights protection and data protec-
tion. I will also illustrate how the blurring of boundaries between 
criminal justice and administrative finalities endangers democracy 
itself.
It is somehow sad, though, that such elaborate argumentation must 
be given to begin with. Just like the default position that ‘judicial’ 
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cooperation is more than cooperation between judicial authorities 
(supra), the existence of the distinction between criminal justice and 
administrative finalities is supported through the very legislation of 
the EU itself. In several cooperation instruments adopted in the past 
decades (ECMA, EU MLA, ‘Swedish’ FD, Data Protection FD), it has 
been recognised that cooperation in criminal matters is a matter of 
cooperation between authorities, aimed at the prevention, detection, 
tracing, prosecution, punishment etc of punishable offences. It is a pity 
that this has only been the case in a fragmented way, ad hoc, using 
divergent wording, not in all relevant cooperation instruments and 
sometimes for specific investigative measures only. It is my conviction 
is that the finality of action by authorities must become the primary, 
resolute demarcation line for international cooperation in criminal 
matters in the EU. The outdated authority-based policy-making, 
reasoning and practice should make way for the introduction of a new, 
clear, unambiguous focus on protecting the integrity of cooperation 
with a criminal justice finality.
2. Lack of finality demarcation problematic
a. Separation of powers
Despite the fact that the demarcation line between the judiciary and 
the executive keeps fading and the grip of the latter on the former 
tightens, the separation of powers remains the cornerstone of modern 
and democratic public law. Criminal law constitutes a social contract 
between government and civil society and consequently the fight 
against criminality is a prerogative of the government, yet not every 
segment of government. The task to fight criminality is reserved to 
the judiciary and the police judiciaire (i.e. police when they are acting 
with a criminal justice finality), customs or inspection authorities 
(i.e. inspection authorities when acting with a criminal justice final-
ity). These authorities are kept in check by the rules of play which 
protect civil society against disproportionate or arbitrary investigative 
behaviour. Following the principle of the separation of powers those 
rules of play are set by the legislator.
The role of the government, of the executive, and of the administra-
tions, administrative authorities or other actors which resort under the 
2011-10 - free gaterhering and movement.indd   23 18/10/11   17:22
gERT vERmEulEn
24 Maklu
latter’s power carries a fundamentally different finality. In essence, the 
executive has a fundamentally different function than fighting crime. 
It monitors public order and security (and steers the administrative 
police in that regard). For that aim, it traditionally disposes of a civil 
and military intelligence service, is responsible for the shaping and 
implementing of the criminal justice policy and carries the administra-
tive responsibility for the adequate functioning of justice and police. 
In other words, the executive acts with an administrative as opposed 
to a justice finality – a distinction stemming from the very principle 
of separation of powers.14
b. Procedural guarantees applicable in criminal matters
The fight against criminality carried out by justice and law enforce-
ment authorities acting with a criminal justice finality can policy-wise 
be broadened somewhat through involving administrative or other 
actors. However, it is crucial that such broadening does not intrinsi-
cally undermine the very philosophy underlying the social contract, 
i.e. that the enforcement of criminal justice norms is a matter for 
the judiciary and not for the government. This is logical given that 
fighting criminality is limited by the procedural guarantees applicable 
in criminal matters, guarantees which have been subject to a delicate 
and gradually evolving balancing exercise between the interests of the 
individual and the public interest. This balance is alien to acts done 
with an administrative finality, and rightly so. Whereas criminal law 
has an intrinsically punitive character, the administration’s aim is 
to assess and eliminate threats against the government, the society 
and the security, without affecting individuals in a punitive manner. 
The administration is not designed to punish the individuals which 
caused the threat and consequently operates under a fundamentally 
different regime. Indeed, not the rights of the individuals but the 
rights of the apparatus are the primary concern.
In those cases where the administration does step in the criminal law 
terrain, it has to acknowledge the criminal justice logic of acting in 
that context, and doing so brings about consequences. The latter is 
precisely where things go wrong. All too often administrative detours 
are sought in order to avoid the ‘burdens’ which go hand in hand 
with acting with a criminal justice finality. Procedural guarantees 
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applicable in criminal matters are considered to be hindering the 
full coming into being of the novel ‘right to security’ which has so 
successfully been sold to the citizens. Two examples.
The declaration of the UK regarding the rules of play for the cross-
border interception of telecommunication in criminal matters in 
the EU MLA is a good case-study. It was already clear that in the UK 
governmental entities can give orders of interception to police and 
custom authorities. When the official aim of such orders is to trace 
severe offences, the UK accepts the applicability of Article 20 EU 
MLA. This also applies when such orders are given to intelligence 
services, when they officially act in support of a criminal investiga-
tion as determined in Article 20. Leaving aside how peculiar the 
resolute and direct involvement of intelligence services in criminal 
investigations may be, the good news is that in such cases the criminal 
justice safeguards apply. In other words, even intelligence services 
can form part of the criminal justice process, as long as they behave 
as actors within the criminal justice chain. Authorities do not matter, 
finalities do. So far this example subscribes the proposed key notion 
of ‘international cooperation with a criminal justice finality’. The 
explanation for this mechanism however, has a downside. Naturally, 
the real intention behind the UK declaration was to secure the practice 
whereby interception orders are given to intelligence or security 
services when they do not formally act in support of criminal inves-
tigations and would thus stay outside of the scope of the EU MLA. 
As such this does not seem problematic: acting without criminal 
justice finality does indeed not require the application of criminal 
justice safeguards. What is problematic, however, is this: intercepted 
information which is collected with a primarily administrative aim can 
without hindrance be re-channelled to investigations with a criminal 
justice finality, with the creative justification that the criminal justice 
finality is only secondary. Echelon activities, to be precise, needed to 
be kept out of range of official reproach, even when they produce 
useful information for dealing with terrorism or organised crime.
Another example concerns the cross-border execution of undercover 
operations in criminal matters under the EU MLA. Prior to this 
arrangement, justice and police were conducting such operations in a 
legal vacuum (not to say illegally), facilitated through the International 
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Working Group on Undercover Policing. As such it was positive that a 
‘regulated’ alternative to this practice was created. However, consider-
ing the criminal justice scope of application of the EU MLA, the new 
provisions did not produce any impact on the cross-border activities 
of intelligence services, which kept using the International Working 
Group as a tool for their activities and could and still can channel the 
acquired information into the criminal justice sphere.
Also The Netherlands seem to care marginally only about mixing 
up criminal justice and administrative finalities. Information shar-
ing between authorities acting with criminal justice and admin-
istrative finalities has been proclaimed the new best practice, it 
seems. It suffices to refer to the BIBOB legislation (Bevordering 
Integriteitsbeoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur), the Regional 
Information and Expertise Centres (RIECs) that have been established 
in support of the ‘administrative’ approach to organised crime or the 
Amsterdam Emergo project, making data mining and data sharing 
between fiscal, administrative and criminal law enforcement authori-
ties a standard practice. Effective. No doubt. Problematic. Definitely.
Our study on the future of international cooperation in criminal mat-
ters shows that (only) three member states have chosen to explicitly 
bring telecommunication interceptions and undercover operations 
with criminal justice finality by their intelligence services under 
the scope of the EU MLA, thus providing a procedural guarantee 
framework that equals that in criminal matters.
These examples show that, at least in some member states, the situ-
ation is blurred, with a potentially significant cross-border impact. It 
certainly is blurring in other member states too, reinforced by 9/11 
in particular. Hence, a reflection about cross-border information or 
evidence gathering is in vain if it does not aim to unravel the blurred 
line between criminal justice and intelligence work. Clear EU action in 
this regards is long overdue. A choice must be made to either clearly 
apply the relevant provisions to intelligence services when they are 
acting with a criminal justice finality (be it directly or indirectly) or 
to clearly delineate the limits of competences of intelligence services 
(and thus bar them from gathering information or acting when these 
acts would have a direct or indirect criminal justice finality). The latter 
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seems politically unrealistic since it entails a direct intervention in 
the national law of the member states. Therefore, the former is the 
only solution at EU level: instead of defining the scope of instruments 
dealing with international cooperation in criminal matters based on 
the authorities involved, it should be defined based on the finality with 
which they act. In doing so, if intelligence services are (directly or 
indirectly) acting with a criminal justice finality, it will be guaranteed 
that the necessary accompanying criminal justice safeguards apply. 
When other authorities than the traditional ones want to take part 
in the enforcement of criminal law, they need to be bound by the 
same – instead of less – rules of play.15 This course of action received 
overwhelming support in our study on the future of international 
cooperation in criminal matters. Even the second option, being the 
clear delineation of competences of intelligence services in that they 
would be barred from gathering information or acting when these 
acts would have a direct or indirect criminal justice finality, gained 
broad support.
c. Data protection and purpose limitation16
The purpose limitation or finality principle constitutes a core principle 
of data protection law and is recognized as such by the EU. This 
principle does not exclude the possibility for entities to gather private 
information with a criminal justice character, but it prevents those 
entities to use such information for purposes which do not have a 
criminal justice character. It thus prohibits the practice of entities 
providing such information to other entities, unless the use of that 
information has a purely criminal justice finality.
Unfortunately, there are numerous examples within EU law eroding 
the purpose limitation principle. I suffice giving two. The first example 
can be found in the Data Protection FD: even though Article 3 FD 
Data Protection stresses the purpose limitation principle, it is being 
put up for grabs later on in the FD (Article 11). The default position 
outlined in Article 3 is that personal details can only be processed for 
the purpose for which they have been collected. The second paragraph 
specifies under which conditions they can be passed on for different 
purposes and Article 11 contains an enumeration of those other 
purposes. A close reading of Article 11 reveals a breach of the purpose 
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limitation principle. While provisions a) and b) can be justified, provi-
sion d) renders the purpose limitation meaningless: the information 
can be used for any other purpose than for which it was originally 
collected, if the member state or the person concerned consent to 
this. The consent of the person concerned (who can freely dispose of 
his/her own privacy) could indeed be a viable exception, but only if 
that consent – and with it, the purpose limitation principle – cannot 
not be circumvented when the member state consents instead. The 
second example concerns the second Schengen Information System 
(SIS II). In the SIS II, breaches of the finality principle were legally 
anchored at EU level: information gathered by security services can 
smoothly be channelled to the criminal justice sphere, even where 
no criminal justice procedural safeguards have been respected in 
gathering the evidence.
These examples underpin the importance of respecting finalities 
in the context of information fluxes from the criminal justice to 
the administrative sphere and vice versa. This can also be applied 
to administrations which, for issuing certificates or in the context 
of public procurement policy, need access to information regard-
ing the involvement of persons concerned in certain criminal 
offences.
3. Flexible finality demarcation?
a. Administrative sanctions: Only seemingly a cross-over
The separation of finalities forms a – silent – part of the EU acquis. 
This follows from the analysis of several provisions above. Through 
the analysis it became apparent that the EU traditionally focuses on 
the aim of the actions in the sense that they need to be taken in the 
context of a criminal investigation, or on the nature of the offences, 
or on both. The cooperation in criminal matters at EU-level has 
traditionally been limited to the context of criminal offences. The 
fact that within the EU there is a considerable diversity in naming 
certain misdemeanours as being of a criminal justice or administra-
tive nature, threatened to hinder cooperation considerably. Indeed, 
member states where petty offences were not labelled as criminal 
could not obtain cooperation for those offences, given that they did not 
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fall within the realm of the cooperation instrumentarium. Hence, this 
constituted a break on cooperation, but a break which was perfectly 
justifiable in light of the criminal justice finality: administrative 
offences are traditionally placed outside the criminal justice sphere 
and they are consequently treated in a very different framework, 
without containing the procedural safeguards applicable in criminal 
matters. This means that in general the detection, prosecution etc. of 
administrative offences usually happens with an administrative – as 
opposed to criminal justice – finality.
Building on the SIC acquis, the EU MLA has extended MLA under 
certain conditions to the category of administrative offences. This is 
understandable, given the relatively large number of offences which 
is initially handled by administrative authorities in several member 
states. Examples are the Ordnungswidrigkeiten in Germany or the 
Dutch traffic offences under the Lex Mulder. Crucial is that the EU 
added a condition which guarantees that the member states will 
indeed apply the procedural guarantees which form part of criminal 
procedures when detecting and/or prosecuting such administrative 
offence. In concrete terms the condition is that – if member states 
wish to bring the detection and prosecution of administrative offences 
within the realm of the EU cooperation instrumentarium – there 
is an appeal possibility before courts which are (also) competent in 
criminal matters.
This system extends the concept of criminal justice finality, but it is 
not in violation of it, quite the contrary. The baseline of the reason-
ing, namely that when the purpose of the acts is the detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences the procedural safeguards from 
criminal procedures should apply, still stands. Through imposing the 
condition of an appeal before a court competent in criminal matters 
the prosecution of those administrative offences is brought inside 
the criminal justice system and consequently under the application 
of the necessary procedural safeguards. In other words, the extension 
confirms the default position.
Therefore, it is crucial not to deviate from the criminal justice appeal 
condition. The only nuance – it is more of a clarification – can be that 
the competent appeal judge would have an administrative ‘name tag’, 
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but could treat certain administrative offences in accordance with the 
procedural safeguards applicable in criminal matters. In those cases 
the philosophy that the finality of the authority’s actions outweighs 
its name-tag needs to apply consistently: as long as the authorities 
involved fit the criteria imposed by the ECtHR17 (and only then), 
it should be possible to bring administrative offences within the 
realm of the extended criminal justice finality. A translation of this 
position in the applicable legislation could speed up the mentality 
change from focus on authority to finality, and could avoid useless 
or illogical bans from international cooperation in criminal matters. 
This being said, given the importance of the appeal condition, a 
restrictive interpretation remains necessary.
b. Prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security: 
A legitimate cross-over
To favour a distinction between criminal justice and administrative 
finality is one thing. To lose touch with reality another. Sense of 
reality indeed leads to the recognition of a legitimate link between 
both finalities, namely when there is ‘an immediate and serious 
threat to public security’. In this case it should remain possible to 
exchange certain information or to take actions in disregard of the 
demarcation of finalities.
Throughout the EU instrumentarium many exceptions related to 
public security considerations can be found (e.g. in the ‘Swedish 
FD, the EEW and the Criminal Records FD). They all contain the 
aforementioned limited exception on the finality principle: where 
the information can normally only be transmitted for the same (or 
a closely related) aim as for which it was originally collected, the 
information can also be transmitted for other purposes, under the 
condition that there is an immediate and serious threat to public 
security. This public order exception is not only acceptable but even 
necessary in those instances where a strict finality separation would 
be an impediment to the prevention of a threat to public security. 
However, it needs to be stressed that this link between administrative 
and criminal justice finality has to be applied restrictively. The Data 
Protection FD for example creates a much too loose link between 
both finalities: it is sufficient that the original member state consents 
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(the consent of the person not being required) in order to justify the 
usage of the information for any purpose thinkable. This entails 
an unacceptable broadening of the public security exception. If the 
EU is indeed as serious about the finality principle as it claims in 
several instruments, limits need to be set consistently to the allowed 
deviations. Information needs to be able to flow from criminal justice 
to administrative sphere when there is an imminent threat to public 
security, but only then.
Regrettably, ‘creative’ deviations are gaining increasing popularity in 
several member states and also in the EU legislation, in particular 
where terrorism or serious crime are concerned. This evolution 
threatens to do away with the very pillar on which the EU legal area 
was built, being the respect for the integrity of procedural guarantees. 
This in itself might very well represent an even bigger threat to the 
public interest – a threat more immediate and serious than many 
(want to) see.
C. Irrespective of the offence (definition) concerned?
Traditionally, MLA was not dependent on double criminality but in 
the execution of letters rogatory in fine of measures as (house) search 
and seizure (ECMA, amended by Article 51 SIC). Later followed 
other techniques, such as the interception of telecommunications 
(EU MLA), access to banking transactions and account information 
and the monitoring of bank accounts (Protocol EU MLA) and the 
cross-border taking of DNA samples (Prüm and Prüm Decision). 
Generically speaking, one could say that no coercive or intrusive 
measures will be executed by a requested member state unless the 
facts for which they have been requested constitute a punishable 
offence on its territory.
The question whether a(n) (partial) abandonment of the dual criminal-
ity condition in these cases might be pursued in view of rendering 
MLA more effective, has been debated for a long time. It was not until 
the EEW that, where the gathering of existing evidence would require 
(house) search or seizure, the dual criminality rule was dropped for 
the ‘32 mutual recognition offences’, traditionally used for that very 
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purpose in preceding mutual recognition instruments. This standard 
approach, which in itself is conceptually problematic,18 was simply 
further pursued in the Draft EIO, turning the abandonment of the 
dual criminality rule for the 32 mutual recognition offences into a 
general principle. If the instrument would be adopted in 2012 (which 
is hoped will not happen, for reasons explained later), the result will 
be that dual criminality will only continue to be an ‘obstacle’ for 
the measures mentioned above where the requesting thereof is for 
another offence than the 32 in the list, according to the law of the 
requesting member state, that is.
D. Any investigative measure?
Obviously, a mandatory execution of any investigative measures 
requested will often require the requested member state to go beyond 
the limits of its own legal system. When it comes to the (execution of) 
measures as (house) search and seizure (Article 51 SIC), interception 
of telecommunications (EU MLA), access to banking transactions and 
account information and the monitoring of bank accounts (Protocol 
EU MLA) and the cross-border taking of DNA samples (Prüm and 
Prüm Decision), a consistency test of the requested measure with 
the law of the requested member state is the rule.
Execution can be inconsistent with the law of the requested member 
state in that it surpasses the scope ratione auctoritatis because the 
requesting or issuing authority (or the authority having validated 
the request or decision) is not a judge, a court, an investigating 
magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a similar national case 
the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by such an 
authority (see e.g. the explicit non-execution ground in the EEW). 
When doing away with the artificial distinction between judicial and 
police authorities, and provided the necessary ‘judicial’ safeguards 
are in place, this type of inconsistency should no longer constitute 
an obstacle for cooperation.
However, execution can also be inconsistent with the law of the 
executing member state in other respects, for which it seems harder 
to easily find a solution.
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The requested investigative measure may e.g. surpass the scope 
ratione loci, ratione temporis or ratione personae (because the measure(s) 
can only be taken for a more limited category of persons). For the 
latter scope, the link with corporate criminal liability issues and 
the possibility to execute investigative measures is obvious. On the 
basis of the Commission-funded Study on the liability of legal persons 
for offences in the national legal systems of the member states of the 
European Union, which IRCP will conclude in early 2012, we hope 
to be able to trigger a breakthrough on the matter, in the sense that 
inconsistencies relating to diverging corporate criminal liability 
issues should by no means frustrate cross-border cooperation. More 
difficult to overcome are inconsistencies relating to the fact that in 
the requested member state, certain investigative measures may be 
limited to a more narrow category of natural persons in terms of for 
example their age, procedural status and definition.
The requested investigative measure may also surpass the scope 
ratione materiae, which is linked to the double criminality requirement 
(supra). This will not be easily solved. Even after a year of negotiations, 
the Draft EIO only rules out refusal on this basis when it comes to 
one of the 32 mutual recognition offences.
The chief novelty that the Draft EIO introduces, i.e. that any meas-
ure requested (except the setting up of a JIT), even if not expressly 
regulated in MLA (which until now is covered by the flexible and 
smart obligation for member states to afford one another the ‘widest’ 
measure of mutual assistance as embedded in Article 1 ECMA), will 
have to be executed, is therefore bound to fail. Notably, the draft EIO 
does not resolve inconsistency issues ratione loci, ratione temporis or, 
beyond the 32 mutual recognition offences, ratione materiae. Its belief 
that member states will further be prepared to systematically execute 
measures in case that these may be simply unknown to their legal 
system, seems quite naive, to say the least.
E. For free?
There is nothing like a free lunch. It is very unlikely therefore that 
furthering the stringency in cooperation through a radical introduc-
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tion of mutual recognition in current MLA (as envisaged in the draft 
EIO) is realistic. Especially not if – as in the draft EIO – the idea is to 
bring any investigative measure under a stringent mutual recogni-
tion regime, softened only by a duty on the side of the requesting or 
issuing member authority to not ask for the taking of measures if 
this would be disproportionate in light of the (limited) seriousness of 
the offences or the (limited) importance of the case concerned. Such 
mechanism lacks credibility of course. It only appeals to self-restraint 
on the side of requesting authorities, ruling out any possibility for the 
requested member state or authority to refuse or not execute where 
it would find the taking of the measure(s) a disproportionate or too 
much of a burden in terms of financial or operational capacity. The 
possible implications in terms of operational or financial capacity for 
the executing member state in executing under a stringent mutual 
recognition regime may be very substantial and give rise to even more 
problems than under the current regime, the default rule of which 
is that capacity issues do not constitute a refusal ground, each of the 
cooperating parties bearing its own costs (ECMA). Already today, 
a(n) (alleged) lack of capacity is not seldom frustrating MLA. An 
empirical study, conducted by IRCP in 2009-2010, on the execution 
of Belgian MLA requests by The Netherlands, provides convincing 
proof thereof.19 The need for a debate on capacity is urgent, especially 
since – with the Draft EIO – the fetish of mutual recognition is about 
to radically change MLA and strangulate criminal justice systems 
either financially or in terms of operational capacity.
1. Financial capacity
In the study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters, roughly half of the member states have declared that financial 
capacity should somehow constitute a refusal ground. Based on those 
results, we have designed three future policy options, which were 
tested either in the context of that study or the preceding study on 
EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. 
A first option could be to further develop the existing provisions on 
cost-sharing between member states. A second option could be to put 
the financial burden completely on the requesting or issuing member 
state. A third could be to allow the executing member state to suggest 
less costly alternatives. Each of them are further explored below.
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a. Cost-sharing
In the study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters, half of the member states have pointed out that financial 
arrangements do matter in international cooperation. Financial 
uncertainty is said to cause delays in cooperation and to undermine 
trust between cooperating authorities.
As a way to make the financial arrangements clear-cut at the onset of 
any cooperation initiative, it seems worth considering to introduce 
a cost-sharing principle that mirrors the benefit-sharing principle 
that has been included in the 2006 FD on the mutual recognition 
of confiscation orders. The latter FD has introduced the splitting of 
revenue from the execution of confiscation orders surpassing the 
amount of € 10.000 on a 50/50 basis between the executing and the 
requesting member state. Only if the revenue is not very significant 
(i.e. below € 10.000) it will accrue to the executing member state. 
This may not seem directly relevant for the analysis of financial 
issues that executing requests or orders for cooperative measures 
can entail. However, the possibility of broadening this approach 
embedded in the FD Confiscation as to the 50/50 division of profits 
to a possible future 50/50 division of substantial costs in execut-
ing MLA requests or mutual recognition orders, deserves further 
reflection and has therefore been tested in the study on the future of 
international cooperation in criminal matters. Although most issuing 
member states do not ask the executing states to share the benefits 
and benefits are not often shared when there is no obligation to do 
so, benefit-sharing is considered to be a fair option and especially so 
when the investigation is exceptionally costly or when benefits are 
exceptionally high. The € 10.000 threshold could be used therefore, 
but is probably quite high. Surely, a symbolic threshold system will 
not be sufficient to cope with the upcoming problems that the Draft 
EIO is likely to produce.
b. Costs borne by the requesting or executing member state
Provisions stipulating that the costs should be borne by the issuing 
member state, unless the executing member state has waived its right 
for a refund already exist as an exception to the general rule and can 
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be found in various instruments, relating to either costs of substantial 
or extraordinary nature, to certain costs that the execution of requests 
for hearings by video conference can entail or to telecommunication 
interception costs (EU MLA), or to expenses for fees paid to experts 
(Naples II).
The study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters showed that it is highly exceptional for an executing state to 
waive its right for a refund so that in the above mentioned situations 
(video links, telecommunications operators and expert fees) costs are 
effectively borne by the issuing state as an exception to the general 
rule. Member states also thought that the costs of undercover opera-
tions should be completely borne by the requesting member state. 
The draft EIO, merely copying the provisions of EU MLA relating to 
undercover operations, again proves to lack touch with reality.
c. Suggest less costly alternatives
Another option could be to allow the executing member state to 
suggest less costly alternatives. If specific expensive techniques and/
or equipment are needed in order to cooperate with the issuing state, 
alternative solutions may sometimes be provided for. The question 
arises to what extent it should be possible for the executing member 
state to suggest or to decide on less costly alternatives. It could be 
argued that an interdiction to suggest alternatives follows from 
a duty to apply the issuing member state’s rules and procedures. 
Such interdiction, though, may be considered a bridge too far by the 
executing member state, because conflicting with its own interests, 
rules and procedures.
Responses, obtained through the study on the future of international 
cooperation in criminal matters, show that a large majority of member 
states sometimes suggest alternatives in reply to explicitly requested 
formalities and procedures, with 1/3rd of the member states specifi-
cally referring to situations where these formalities and procedures 
place a disproportionate burden on their capacity, over 1/5th of the 
member states referring to situations where the requested formalities 
and procedures are believed not to be not necessary and close to half 
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of the member states referring to situations where they believed that 
the same results could be achieved in a more speedy or less costly way.
Similarly, almost all member states thought it should be possible for 
an executing member state to suggest less costly alternatives. However, 
opinions were split on the issue who would eventually have to decide 
on whether or not an alternative course of action would be adopted 
and how this would affect the cost-sharing principle.
2. Operational capacity
Issues related to operational capacity are potentially an even bigger 
obstacle for smooth international evidence gathering in criminal 
matters than financial capacity issues. The executing member state 
may feel that the implications of the execution of a request or order 
in terms of operational capacity or resources would be too heavy and 
thus hamper the proper functioning of its criminal justice system. 
For example, it is very likely that extensive requests require a lot 
of working hours from authorities in the executing member state 
so that the latter considers the impact on its domestic workload 
disproportionally heavy or fears that (priority) domestic cases would 
be jeopardised. In the studies on the EU cross-border gathering and 
use of evidence in criminal matters and on the future of international 
cooperation in criminal matters, it was therefore assessed to what 
extent member states were likely to refuse the execution of requests 
for operational reasons, or if they felt that refusal for these reasons 
should be possible.
Although a majority of member states, both from the perspective 
of being the issuing and executing state, confirm that they are not 
often confronted with operational capacity issues, there is however 
a fair amount of member states (1/4th) that do argue that operational 
capacity issues are significant enough to start an EU level debate 
on how to precisely deal with this. One wonders what actually the 
negotiations on the Draft EIO are about.
Additionally, the question can be raised to what extent an aut exequi aut 
tolerare principle could prove useful, conceptually drawing inspiration 
from the traditional aut dedere aut iudicare and the more recent aut 
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dedere aut exequi principles. In extradition or surrender cases, the 
unwillingness or inability of a member state to extradite or surrender 
a person as an obstacle for execution is overcome by the introduction 
of the aut dedere aut exequi principle, introducing an obligation for the 
member state involved to execute the decision itself. A parallel but 
reverse aut exequi, aut tolerare principle would mean that the executing 
member state is to execute the order of the issuing member state or 
alternatively (e.g. in case of operational capacity issues) tolerate the 
competent authorities of the issuing member state to execute the 
order themselves on the other member state’s territory. Introducing 
this principle with regard to MLA would simply extend the current 
international cooperation acquis. The concept of allowing the active 
presence of foreign investigators on one’s territory is known from 
the JIT and Naples II context, be it only to the extent that member 
have chosen to transpose the concept into their domestic law. The 
principle of tolerare, i.e. tolerating officers of another member state 
on one’s territory, could be extended to those situations in which 
operational capacity issues would lead to difficulties in executing MLA 
requests. If necessary, the scope of the new principle could be limited 
to non-coercive or non-intrusive evidence gathering measures only.
Having tested the idea of aut dedere aut tolerare, it appears that almost 
all member states – in the context of JIT’s or Naples II – allow officers 
of another member state to operate on their territory and that there 
appear no immediate constitutional hurdles for this to take place. 
Further, member states support the newly suggested principle as an 
acceptable future policy option, although most member states would 
limit its application to those aspects of cooperation that do not require 
the involvement of a judicial authority (whatever that is), and less 
than half of the member states to exceptional forms of cooperation 
such as cross-border surveillance and covert operations only.
F. Without borders?
A more radical choice would of course be to simply opt for a tolerare 
principle, by allowing the member states’ authorities acting with a 
criminal justice finality to cross the internal EU borders in view of 
actively gathering evidence in other member states, respecting their 
2011-10 - free gaterhering and movement.indd   38 18/10/11   17:22
FREE gaThERing and movEmEnT oF EvidEncE in cRiminal maTTERs in ThE Eu
Maklu 39
local legislation and/or at least complying with agreed EU minimum 
procedural guarantees. Actually, this is exactly what the founding 
treaties envisage and have envisaged for a long time. Reference 
should be made here to Art. 89 TFEU, a provision which is an almost 
identical copy of Art. 32 former TEU, in existence since the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam. After almost 15 years, one may assume that 
time has come to actually make use of this provision. Art. 89 TFEU 
foresees the possibility for the Council to legislate the conditions 
under which the competent judicial and police authorities of the 
member states can operate on each other’s territories. If politically 
to big a step to envisage a possibility of active crossing of borders in 
search for evidence on an EU-wide scale, it seems that at least the 
Benelux should embark on creating this possibility. Seven years have 
lapsed since the Benelux Police Treaty. Time for a new impulse, I 
believe. It could solve many of the current issues in the Belgo-Dutch 
MLA cooperation reality and would allow the Benelux to again play 
a catalyst role in an EU of variable speed.
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II 
 
Free movement of evidence
The entire question of the gathering of evidence becomes superfluous 
if in the end the obtained evidence will not serve any real purpose in 
trial due to inadmissibility. Currently, it remains completely unclear 
what happens in the end with evidence gathered or obtained on the 
basis of cross-border cooperation. None of the existing MLA or mutual 
recognition instruments even addresses the issue, save for Naples II, 
creating an opening towards per se admissibility of evidence, leaving 
member states the discretion to use it or not though.
A. Mutual admissibility of evidence gathered following a 
cooperation request
1. Forum regit actum
The forum regit actum principle (FRA) has been introduced in the 
EU over 10 years ago (EU MLA). It was supposed to accommodate 
concerns of admissibility of evidence that resulted from foreign 
evidence gathering along the then known cooperation principles.
When assessing the techniques used to accommodate concerns 
of admissibility of evidence, the duality between applying the rule 
of locus regit actum or the rule of forum regit actum is striking. 
Originally, MLA between the EU member states had its sole legal 
basis in the ECMA. That ‘mother treaty’ notes in its Article 3 that 
the requested state shall execute an MLA request in accordance 
with its own rules and regulations, i.e. according to the locus regit 
actum principle. The location where the investigative measure would 
take place was the decisive element in determining applicable law. 
This means that a request made by one state, for which the legal 
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basis can be found in the ECMA, will be executed according to 
the law of the requested state. However, as a result of differences 
between national procedures, sometimes information gathered in 
one member state cannot be used in another member state because 
the way the information was obtained does not fit the national 
procedural requirements. In the following years problems with 
the admissibility of evidence gathered abroad in the context of 
mutual legal assistance requests gained more and more attention. 
The fact that certain formalities or procedural requirements that 
are crucial when determining the admissibility of evidence where 
not complied with during the foreign evidence gathering process 
proved to be a significant hindrance to the effectiveness of foreign 
evidence gathering. Therefore, when developing an EU instrument 
to complement the existing CoE instrument, a solution was sought. 
As a result, the EU MLA now provides that the requesting state 
can ask the requested state to comply with certain formalities or 
procedural requirements that it deems essential under its national 
legislation. According to this forum regit actum principle, the member 
state receiving an MLA request must in principle comply with the 
formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the requesting 
state. The only derogation allowed is to the extent that this would 
be incompatibility with the fundamental principles of the law of 
the executing member state. The state where the forum i.e. the 
court is located, can since have a say in the way evidence is to be 
gathered, in striving for maximized admissibility chances of the 
evidence gathered.
2. Conceptual flaws and weaknesses of forum regit actum
Because the entire design of the evidence landscape and the instru-
ments regulating the gathering of evidence via different investigative 
measures are currently under review, it is important to include a 
critical assessment of FRA therein.
From the very beginning is was clear that FRA had a lot of flaws 
and weaknesses and would not be capable of providing an adequate 
answer to the admissibility concerns.
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First, even though FRA is designed to accommodate the aspirations 
of requesting member states and their concerns with respect to the 
admissibility of evidence gathered upon their request, no commit-
ment to accept per se admissibility can be found in the cooperation 
instruments. This means that a request to take certain formalities or 
procedures into account, does not entail the commitment to accept 
the admissibility of evidence gathered accordingly. In other words, 
an executing member state that puts a lot of effort in gathering 
evidence according to the requested formalities and procedures, has 
no guarantee that its efforts will we rewarded with the recognition 
of the admissibility of the evidence it has gathered. As a result, FRA 
seems to remain but a tool for the requesting member state to impose 
its formalities and procedures upon the requested member state 
without having to commit to accepting admissibility of the evidence 
gathered accordingly.
Second, FRA only has a very limited admissibility-raising effect 
in the sense that it only seeks to ensure admissibility in a one on 
one relation between the requesting and requested member state. 
In doing so, it has no potential of ensuring admissibility within 
the entirety of the Union. However, undeniably, the possibility 
to adjust the way of gathering evidence is a opportunity to work 
towards a situation in which the admissibility of newly gathered 
evidence is accepted throughout the Union. Only an approach that 
ensures EU wide admissibility would really support and shape the 
evolution towards free movement of evidence. FRA intrinsically 
fails to contribute thereto.
Third, even in the one on one situation, the strength of FRA is rela-
tively weak in the sense that it does not create a true and transparent 
situation in terms of the lawfulness of the way evidence was gathered, 
let alone the admissibility of evidence that is linked to that. Allowing 
one member state to request for certain formalities and procedures 
to be taken into account and therefore requiring another member 
state to take those formalities and procedures into account, runs 
the risk of undermining the status of either lawfully or unlawfully 
gathered evidence.
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3. Quick wins
In the study on EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in 
criminal matters, two specific future policy options were tested, 
outlined below. As they both received support of almost all member 
states, they can be introduced almost right away.
The first option entails that information lawfully obtained by a mem-
ber or seconded member while part of a JIT which is not otherwise 
available to the competent authorities of the member states would 
constitute per se admissible evidence under the national law of the 
member states concerned. Under the current regime, such informa-
tion can only be ‘used’ in the latter.
The second option entails the introduction of the possibility for 
competent authorities from other member states that are lawfully 
present on a member state’s territory while executing a request, 
order or warrant (e.g. as a seconded member of a JIT operating on 
the latter’s territory, when present during a hearing or house search 
etc) to draft official reports having the same probative value under 
the law of the member state where they are present as if they had 
been drafted by the latter’s own competent authorities.
4. Quantum Leap: Common minimum standards instead of 
forum regit actum
Beyond the above quick wins, and considering the conceptual flaws 
and weaknesses of FRA, one would expect that the current momentum 
to redesign the entire landscape of MLA and cross-border evidence 
gathering would be seized to drastically rethink the approach to tackle 
admissibility problems. Nothing like that. The Draft EIO simply copies 
the FRA principle from EU MLA, just like the EEW had done. Added 
value of the Draft EIO for the core issue in current EU evidence law, 
especially after the explicit new legal basis in Article 82.2.a TFEU 
for enhancing mutual admissibility of evidence in criminal matters 
between the member states legal : zero.
The only way to remedy things and tackle possible admissibility 
issues is via the introduction of minimum standards according 
2011-10 - free gaterhering and movement.indd   44 18/10/11   17:23
FREE gaThERing and movEmEnT oF EvidEncE in cRiminal maTTERs in ThE Eu
Maklu 45
to which evidence is to be gathered. This would mean that, if per 
se admissibility is aimed at, the information or evidence gathered 
following a cross-border request would have to be gathered accord-
ing to commonly agreed minimum standards. This would do away 
with discussions on the lawfulness of the information or evidence 
gathering technique and subsequently, the evidence gathered would 
constitute admissible evidence before court in all 27 member states. 
Newly gathered evidence in a cross-border context would be subject 
to an irrefutable presumption of admissibility and consequently 
become eligible for free movement throughout the Union. So far, 
already 1/3rd of the member states judges the FRA rule outdated and 
wants to see it replaced by the introduction of minimum standards, 
which they view as the only way forward. Another 1/3rd is very much 
in favour of the idea but is hesitant as to whether minimum standards 
would be able to do away with the FRA principle altogether. When it 
comes to the level of the standards, member states suggest to base 
them on existing MLA regulations, backed up with standards that 
either surpass the ECHR/ECtHR standards or at least equal them. 
Evidence seized during a house search, if carried out in line with the 
standards in the Van Rossem case, would constitute per se admissible 
evidence. Evidence obtained through the interception of telecom-
munications, if complying with the rules outlined by the ECtHR in 
the Malone, Huvig, Kruslin, Klass etc cases, would constitute per se 
admissible evidence. Anonymous witness testimony, if complying 
with the standards laid out by the ECtHR in the Doorson, Kok, Visser, 
Kostovski, Windisch, Lüdi, Unterpertinger, Saïdi, Asch, Artner, Delta, 
Luca, Solakov etc cases would constitute per se admissibility. Etc. It 
may seem difficult an exercise, but it’s doable.20
B. Cross-border admissibility of evidence gathered in a merely 
domestic context
When discussing the concerns related to mutual admissibility of evi-
dence gathered abroad following a cooperation request, no concerns 
were raised relating to the admissibility of evidence that has been 
gathered in another member state prior to any request. That was a 
deliberate choice, because dealing with admissibility concerns related 
to evidence that already exists in another member state falls outside 
2011-10 - free gaterhering and movement.indd   45 18/10/11   17:23
gERT vERmEulEn
46 Maklu
the scope of problems related to cooperation in criminal matters. It 
is not a cooperation problem, because the problem is not situated at 
the level of the cooperation mechanism that ensures the transfer of 
evidence from one member state to another. Rather, it concerns the 
use of evidence gathered in a merely domestic context. This does not 
mean, however, that the problem is irrelevant in reviewing the entirety 
of international cooperation in criminal matters. Therefore, the 
cross-border admissibility of evidence gathered in a merely domestic 
context, and more generally the possibility to attach an EU-wide effect 
to evidence that is gathered and perceived admissible in one member 
state – so that the admissible evidence would be considered admis-
sible in all other member states – is separately addressed hereafter.
The easiest and quite pragmatic solution in fine of cross-border 
admissibility of evidence gathered in a merely domestic context, 
would obviously be to introduce minimum standards for evidence 
gathering all together, obliging member states to include them into 
their national criminal law systems and apply them equally in merely 
domestic as well as in cross-border situations. The legal basis required 
to do so is highly questionable, though. In a strict reading, the pos-
sibility in Article 82.2 TFEU to introduce minimum standards is 
limited to situations where such standards are necessary to facilitate 
mutual recognition of judgments or police and ‘judicial’ cooperation 
in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. Consequently, 
problems originating from merely domestic situations such as the 
effect of evidence that was already gathered in such context, would 
fall outside the scope thereof. However, the (proposed) adoption 
of a number of instruments, such as the Directive on the right to 
translation and interpretation in criminal matters, the Directive on a 
letter of rights and the Draft Directive on the right to legal assistance 
(all urging the member states to transpose the obligations springing 
from them in both a cross-border and merely domestic context), shows 
that the scope limitation of Article 82.2 TFEU is not all that strictly 
linked to cross-border situations. From the political discourse of 
Commissioner Reding and from the contents of the above mentioned 
instruments adopted or proposed following the measures included 
in the Procedural Rights Roadmap, it can be concluded that – as long 
as member states are willing to agree thereto – it is possible to adopt 
minimum rules that are applicable in a merely domestic situation 
2011-10 - free gaterhering and movement.indd   46 18/10/11   17:23
FREE gaThERing and movEmEnT oF EvidEncE in cRiminal maTTERs in ThE Eu
Maklu 47
and therefore require member states to adapt their national law 
when necessary.
In the study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters, the member states’ willingness to extend the adoption of 
minimum procedural rules for evidence gathering beyond a cross-
border context was tested. The prospects are surprisingly good: 2/3rd of 
the member states explicitly indicate that such minimum procedural 
standards should not be limited to cross-border situations, and ought 
to also apply in merely domestic situations. Moreover, member states 
clearly understand the consequences of extending the choice to allow 
minimum standards to be adopted beyond cross-border situations. 
Over 4/5th of them is aware and accepts that this will imply significant 
changes to domestic criminal procedural systems.
I have spoken.
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Free gathering 
and movement of 
evidence in criminal 
matters in the EU
Gert Vermeulen
The landscape of cross-border evidence gathering in criminal 
matters in the EU has become blurred. Non-traditional actors, 
such as administrative authorities and intelligence services, have 
joined traditional judicial and law enforcement authorities in a 
domain which used to be looked upon as predominantly judicial 
cooperation territory.  Criminal justice and administrative finalities 
run the risk of being constantly mixed up. This creates problems in 
light of the separation of powers, adequate legal and procedural 
protection in criminal matters and data protection. Gert Vermeulen 
believes that restoring the balance requires stepping away from 
traditional authority-based thinking and policy-making. He suggests 
to embrace ‘criminal justice finality’ as the key normative marker for 
EU cross-border intelligence, information and evidence gathering 
and exchange  in criminal matters. The traditional distinction 
between judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters can no 
longer be upheld, he concludes. He argues that the distinction is 
largely artificial, creates confusion and produces inconsistencies, 
thus hindering the establishment and further development of a 
coherent EU criminal law policy. 
Vermeulen also challenges the envisaged roll-out of the mutual 
recognition principle in the context of cross-border evidence 
gathering. He is in particular concerned that it would prompt an 
inacceptable burden upon criminal justice systems either financially 
or in terms of operational capacity. 
In order to systemically prevent admissibility problems of cross-
border evidence in courts throughout the EU, he finally pleas for a 
free movement regime for evidence, based on common minimum 
procedural standards according to which it must have been 
gathered.
Prof. dr. Gert  Vermeulen is professor of international and European 
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